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THE CONSEQUENCES OF CUBAN BELLIGERENCY.
Some weeks since there appeared in a leading New York
paper this statement: "Sefior Palma, now delegate of the Cuban
Revolutionary party in the United States, will be the accredited
minister of the new republic at Washington, if President Cleve-
land acknowledges the belligerency of Cuba.- It is hardly prob-
able that any members of the Law School would be deceived by
so palpable a blunder as this. The recognition of belligerency,
when accorded to a people trying to fight their way up to state-
hood, carries with it no right of diplomatic intercourse. If it
did, it would be barely distinguishable from a recognition of
independence. But there are various consequences-positive
and negative-which do flow from the recognized belligerent
status, which may not be so clear, and I have thought it might
be of interest to the readers of this JOURNAL to see them briefly
set forth.
Not that a recognition of the Cuban belligerents is at once
necessary, or proper. That is not a matter to be decided by
sentiment. If one State takes the part of an insurgent body in
another, through sympathy with its wrongs, and desires to aid
it, that is intervention, not recognition. The recognition of
Cuban belligerency should be governed by the interests of this
country which are involved; by the ascertained existence of a
civil and military organization, responsible for its acts and con-
forming to the rules of war; and by the gravity and character of
the contest. Or, to put it more specifically, if the United States
finds its trade considerably affected by the acts of war of a new
de facto State, possessing a definite territory where the old sov-
ereign no longer controls, it recognizes that new body as a bel-
ligerent, and holds him responsible for his conduct for its own
sake.
In regard to these essential facts in Cuba it is rather difficult
to find out the truth. Until the Cubans possess some of the
ports of the island and carry on war by sea, our shipping inter-
ests cannot be much involved. On the other hand, there must
be losses of sugar and tobacco property in the interior belonging
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to Americans, the responsibility for which wlil need determi-
nation.
However, it is not the expediency of a recognition of Cuban
-belligerency, but the legal consequences flowing from such rec-
.ognition that I would here discuss. Perhaps a consideration of
the latter will aid in deciding the former. As between the par-
ent State and the insurgent body, the relations are not changed
by an outside recognition of the latter's belligerency. In theory
the insurgents may be considered traitors and be dealt with in
accordance with municipal law. But in point of fact, the execu-
tive branch of the State will probably accord them the rights of
belligerents, being guided first by the dictates of humanity, and
.second by the danger of retaliation.'
But as between the insurgent body and other powers, a new
relation is introduced, that of neutrality. The revolutionary
flag will be recognized, so that ships bearing it, in spite of the
lack of ordinary clearance papers, will be received at foreign
ports as having a definite standing. Thus, early in our Civil
War, the Sunter put in at Curagao, Holland having recognized
the belligerency of the Confederacy. The commission of the
Sumter's captain was accepted as granted by a lawful belliger-
ent and the ship admitted on the same footing with ships of the
North, though Mr. Seward tried to fasten a piratical character
upon her. A better standing will be gained for the borrowing
-of money-an act which is based upon future expectations-
because the recognition is a stamp of success up to a certain point,
and therefore encourages those expectations.
The insurgent men-of-war will be entitled to the same hospi-
talities as well as limited by the same restrictions in neutral
ports as the ships of the parent State, except so far as these may
be modified by previous treaty. For not having acquired state-
hood and the right of negotiation, the revolutionary body can
have made no treaties. Neutrality thus becomes a real and
practical thing, and its machinery-neutrality laws, foreign
enlistment acts, or whatever other name such regulations may
bear-is put into operation. If a "recognized" insurgent block-
ades a port after due notification, the neutral submits to such
blockade. It admits his right to search for and seize contraband
articles belonging to its subjects and destined for his enemy's
use, on the high seas. The insurgent thus gains considerably from
recognition of his belligerency. He gains in caste; he gains in
2 Case of the Amy Warwick, 2 Black. 635.
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rights; he gains in the facilities for carrying on war. But his
enemy, the parent State, gains as well and as much, also with
reference to third parties.
A state of war is declared to exist. As a lawful belligerent
it may blockade and search and capture for carrying contraband,
and exercise all the rights of war and insist upon all the neutral
duties, which during an unrecognized insurrection would not
come into being.
Thus during the Civil War of 1861-65, the blockade of the
Southern ports, a powerful and unmatched weapon in the hands
of the North, was a belligerent right, its observance a neutral
duty, which foreign recognition of Southern belligerency made
possible. For blockade is a war right solely. When President
Lincoln laid the blockade he virtually recognized the belliger-
ency of the Confederate States himself. During war, too, the
neutral State is responsible for the conduct of its subjects; it is
held to a stricter and more exact accountability than it can be
as a mere friend regarding the internal disorders of a fellow
State, with very possible complacency.
There is another and most valuable consequence of the rec-
ognition of belligerency which the parent State enjoys, it is no
longer responsible for the acts of the insurgents. They may
injure the person or destroy the property of neutral subjects by
land or by sea, and their de facto government is alone responsi-
ble. This is a tremendous weight off the shoulders of the exist-
ing State; if the insurgent body dissolves, its 'responsibility for
such damage vanishes. The neutral who is injured it is that
suffers without redress.
Yet that neutral has a certain interest as well as the other
two bodies, in the results of this recognition. A state of war is
declared to exist between two friendly belligerent bodies. For
such a state of things its neutrality laws provide. Its citizens
can be told just what they can deal in without seizure as contra-
band. Certain seaports are either open, or closed by blockade.
It knows just what its duties are. The air is cleared. A State
jealously watching over the welfare of its subjects and their
commerce, desires most of all to know exactly the conditions
which apply to them. And it may have a certain sympathy for a
struggling, perhaps a long suffering community, which finds
expression in this way.
There are thus three sets of interests which are affected and
altered by recognition of belligerency, those of the insurgent as
regards neutrals, of the parent State as regards neutrals, and of
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the neutrals as affected by a state of war. Let us try to apply
these principles to the case of Cuba. The insurgents would
have a better chance of selling bonds, a flag recognized by other
States, and war rights against neutral commerce.
Spain would hold the United States government to a stricter
accountability in the prevention of filibustering expeditions and
the detention of ships capable of being used for war. For all such
breaches of neutrality, the United States would be responsible in
damages unless it could prove that it had exercised reasonable
care and diligence. Its municipal statutes would no longer be
the measure of its duties in this regard.
Spain also would possess the rights of a belligerent against
United States commerce, which is not the case at present. Thus
if the Cubans succeeded in capturing some or all of the seaport
towns of the island, Spain having control of the sea with her
navy, could and probably would shut out all neutral trade from
them, through blockade. She would have the right of capturing
all war material shipped from this country to Cuba for the use of
the insurgents, whatever the ownership, even on the high seas.
In enforcing these rights her gunboats could stop, visit and
search any commercial vessel of the United States. The Ali-
anfa incident would often be repeated, but on the high seas,
while remonstrance or resistance would be unlawful.
Again, Spain would be relieved of responsibility for all dam-
age done by the insurgents to the property of neutral subjects in
Cuba, while at present in such case, it is probable that she could
be held liable.
The United States in turn, confronted by a war between two
lawful belligerents, must duly respect their war rights. Its
merchantmen must keep away from blockaded ports, must sub-
mit to exasperating search, can carry on trade in contraband
only under penalty of the loss of the goods and often of the ships
as well, if caught in the act. Its citizens owning property in
Cuba would find it indistinguishable from belligerent property
and subject to all the casualties of war. Its citizens who evaded
our laws and sought service in the revolutionary army would
lose their right of protection and must expect the same treat-
ment that the insurgents met with. And its trade with the island
in certain contingencies, would be entirely cut off, so that the
interchange of breadstuffs and manufactures for sugar and
tobacco would be as dead as the cotton trade between England
and the South during our Civil War, kept alive only by a few
cargoes which ran successfully the risks of blockade. The treaty
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made with Spain one hundred and one years ago, except those
articles which are obsolete, has also a bearing on our subject, for
its specific provisions must be added to the general rules of In-
ternational Law. Thus the list of articles which shall be consid-
ered contraband is there laid down, and Article XIV. forbids the
subjects of either State to accept letters of marque from an
enemy of the other, under penalty of being punished as pirates.
So that no United States citizen could fit out a privateer in the
Cuban interest. He would be violating treaty obligation and
our own statutes as well.
Bearing these legal consequences in mind, it is probable that
our recognition of Cuban belligerency would help Spain first and
most, the Cuban cause secondarily, and would be decidedly
injurious to the interests of the United States. Recognizing
this, one of the profound jurists in the Senate advocates a rec-
ognition of independence rather than of belligerency. That of
course would be a recognition of a fact which is non-existent, and
must be avowedly a war measure aimed at Spain. France did
this in 1778, by way of expressing her hostility to England, and
war with England resulted as a matter of course. What the
senator's cause of war with Spain is, he does not divulge. It is
a source of wonder that no one has yet invoked the Monroe
Doctrine in the matter.
Thus it would seem to be for the interest of the United States
to let the present status in Cuba continue, rather than to recog-
nize the insurgents' belligerency, an act which would be quite at
variance with our own precedents. If recognition should be
determined upon, however, Spain, though she might feel
aggrieved, would not really be injured; she would not be put in
a relatively worse position for coercing Cuba. But to couple
with this recognition, a request to Spain to grant the independ-
ence of Cuba, is a slap in the face.
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